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For several months in 1987, a retail clerk’s union mounted an unsuccessful 
campaign to organize about 200 employees  at a large non-union retail store 
specializing in appliances and electronics goods.  The store was located in a “strip 
mall” in the metropolitan area near Hartford, Connecticut. As with strip malls 
elsewhere, the store shared a rectangular swath of land with more than a dozen 
smaller retail stores, and was bordered by a busy major boulevard.  To contact the 
store’s employees, the union organizers, who were not employees of the store 
itself, entered the mall’s parking lot on two occasions to place handbills on cars 
that belonged to employees.  The parking lot was open to the general public to visit 
or shop at any of the  stores.  During the entry by union organizers, no traffic was 
blocked, no customers were bothered, and no business was disrupted.   
 
Responding to the union’s activity in the parking lot, which was owned by the 
store and the mall’s developer, store representatives told the union’s organizers 
that they needed to leave because they were on private property.  In one instance, 
the police were summoned.  The police instructed the organizers to stay on a 
narrow grassy strip of public land alongside the boulevard.  In asking the union 
organizers to leave, the store relied on a policy, consistently enforced in the  past, 
prohibiting solicitation of any kind on its property, whether by unions or 
charitable groups.    
  
Through all of the union’s efforts over the next few months, which included 
newspaper ads, picket signs held aloft, and tracking down car license plate 
information, the union acquired the names and addresses of  41 store employees.  
After multiple mailings and a number of phone calls and personal contacts, only 
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one authorization card was signed approving the union as the workplace 
representative.   
 
On these facts, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Lechmere v. NLRB1 that 
the employer’s property rights and trespass laws were properly invoked to 
prohibit  the union’s access to the parking lot to communicate with employees.    
 
Leading to the Supreme Court’s decision was the union’s claim that the store’s ban 
on parking lot solicitation interfered with the union’s right to organize under 
Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).2  The NLRA, passed in 1935 
and amended in significant measure in 1947,  is the principal statute governing 
labor relations in the private sector of the United States economy.3  Section 7 of the 
NLRA is the key statement of union and employee organizing rights under federal 
law, providing, in relevant part, that,  “Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection.”  Over the years, Section 7 has been interpreted as protecting the right 
of unions to communicate with employees about the advantages of unionization, 
and about expressing solidarity with other employees.4  This proposition is 
consistent with longstanding First Amendment preservation of freedom of speech 
and association for union communications.5 
 
According to the union, as a result of the employer’s action to bar leaflet 
distribution in the parking lot, the store violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.  
Section 8(a)(1) states that it shall be an “unfair labor practice” for an employer “to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed 
                                                 
1502 U.S. 527 (1992).  The facts recounted in this article are drawn from the Supreme Court 
decision, and also from the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board and the Court of 
Appeals, reported , respectively, at 295 NLRB 92 (1989) and 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990). 
229 U.S.C. Section 157.  
3See, generally, 29 U.S.C. Section 150, et seq. 
4See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564 n. 13 (1978).  
5Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 533-534 (1945). 
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in section 7.”6   In essence, the union urged that the employer’s insistence on strict 
enforcement of its property interest in the form of a parking lot access ban created 
an impermissible obstacle to the union’s organizing attempts. 
 
The National Labor Relations Board, the administrative agency charged with 
overseeing union and employer rights under the NLRA, agreed with the union, 
determining that the trespass laws should give way, and that the store violated the 
NLRA by denying parking lot access to the union.  The Board’s decision was 
enforced at the appellate stage.  However, the Supreme Court reversed the Board 
in a decision with six justices in the majority, and three judges dissenting. 
 
As a starting point, the Court stated that the NLRA confers rights on employees, 
not on unions or their organizers.7    The rights of the latter are, in the Court’s view, 
derivative, and not equivalent to the primary rights of employees at the work site.  
While acknowledging that employees can be assisted by unions in deciding 
whether to unionize, the Court drew a sharp distinction between those who are 
working on an employer’s property, and those who are not.  In doing so, the Court 
relied on a previous Supreme Court decision from 1956: NLRB v. Babcock & 
Wilcox Co.8  That case also involved a union claim for access rights for non-
employees.   
 
The property at issue in Babcock & Wilcox was an isolated factory off a main road, 
but not far from a small town in which many of the employees lived.   As Babcock 
& Wilcox made clear, and Lechmere confirmed, employees generally are free to 
communicate with each other about unionization while they are at the workplace.9   
Such activity preferably takes place during non-work times and  in non-work areas 
such as break rooms, cafeterias, and the like, unless it is demonstrated that a 
restriction is necessary to maintain production or to protect another valid interest 
of the employer.10  In a passage designed to guide future application of the Court’s 
                                                 
629 U.S.C. Section 158(a)(1). 
7502 U.S. at 531-532. 
8351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
9502 U.S. at 533, citing Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113, and Republic Aviation v. NLRB, 
324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945). 
10Id. 
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decision in Babcock & Wilcox, the Court stated that an employer’s right to control 
its property, and the union’s right to organize under Section 7 of the NLRA, must 
be subject to “accommodation” with “as little destruction of one as is consistent 
with the maintenance of the other.”11   If the Court in Babcock & Wilcox had 
stopped with that admonition, some of the problems encountered later, in 
Lechmere, might have been avoided.   
 
However, the majority in Lechmere focused instead on another portion of the 
Babcock & Wilcox decision; one that permitted the Court to establish a more rigid 
barrier to non-employee union access to employer property.  Hence, as the Court 
said in Babcock & Wilcox, only when “the location of a plant and the living 
quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable 
union efforts to communicate”12 can an employer’s property rights be 
compromised, and only “to the extent needed to permit communication of 
information on the right to organize.”13 
 
Compounding potential confusion from the tension in these portions of the 
Babcock & Wilcox ruling, over the next 20 years a shadow was cast on Babcock & 
Wilcox’s precedential force by developments in constitutional and administrative 
law.  As to constitutional law, freedom of expression under the First Amendment, 
including labor union communication, was extended in 1968 to shopping centers.14  
The Court’s rationale for this approach was that shopping centers constitute the 
modern equivalent of the town center and public streets in which open debate has 
been protected through the evolution of constitutional principles.  
 
This view of the broad reach of First Amendment freedoms to shopping centers 
was narrowed in the 1970's, and eventually overruled, but not without carving out 
a distinction for labor union activity that preserves special communication rights, 
and potential limits on employer property rights.15  This ongoing assurance is 
                                                 
11351 U.S. at 112. 
12502 U.S. at 533-534, quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112. 
13Id., at 534, quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 112. 
14Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590  v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 
(1968). 
15Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Central Hardware Co. V. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 
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reflected in the Hudgens case which rejected First Amendment rights in shopping 
centers, but preserved the possibility of non-employee labor union activity in such 
locations. In the Hudgens decision, unions could take heart from the Court’s 
observation that, “the locus” of the necessary accommodation between Section 7 
organizing rights and private property rights “may fall at differing points along 
the spectrum depending on the nature and strength” of the contrasting rights.16 
 
In the area of administrative law, the most significant development after Babcock 
& Wilcox  was the Supreme Court’s decision in 1984 in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,17 Applying the doctrine established in 
that case, the judiciary is instructed to defer to an agency’s “permissible 
construction” of a statute where the legislature has not specifically and clearly 
addressed the issue.18 
 
Taken together, these developments prompted the NLRB to reformulate its 
approach to union organizer access rights in 1988.  In the Board’s Jean Country 
decision,19  issued while Lechmere was pending, the Board stated that it would 
weigh the relative strength of employee and employer rights, the degree to which 
the respective rights would be impaired by granting or denying access, and “the 
availability of reasonably effective alternative means” of communication.20  Under 
Jean Country, information conveyed through newspapers, radio, and television 
would not, in the typical case, be deemed an adequate alternative to access for 
direct communication.21 
 
According to the Court majority in Lechmere, Jean Country departed from the 
previous ruling in Babcock & Wilcox which was based on “clear” statutory 
language, and therefore the Court need not defer to the Board’s administrative 
expertise under the Chevron doctrine.22  The Court also observed that the Board’s 
                                                 
16424 U.S. at 522. 
17 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
18Id., 467 U.S. at 842-843. 
19291 NLRB 11 (1988).  Jean Country superceded a previous articulation by the Board in 
Fairmont Hotel Co., 282 NLRB 139 (1986). 
20Id., 291 NLRB at 14. 
21Id., 291 NLRB at 12, 18, n. 18. 
22502 U.S. at  536-538. 
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ruling was at odds with the “heavy” burden placed on the union to show an 
inability to reach employees off-site as a reason to override laws against trespass at 
the workplace.23 
 
In the Court’s view, an access dispute  is not to be resolved by balancing employer 
and employee (and union) interests in terms of property and organizing rights. 
Instead, said the Court, referring to the “accommodation” language in Babcock & 
Wilcox and later in Hudgens, “So long as nonemployee union organizers have 
reasonable access to employees outside an employer’s property, the requisite 
accommodation has taken place.  It is only where such access is infeasible that it 
becomes necessary and proper to take the accommodation inquiry to a second 
level, balancing the employees’ and employers ’rights.”24 
 
Rather than remand the dispute to the Board for another administrative review, 
the Court applied its “infeasibility” standard to the union’s organizing campaign 
in Lechmere.  In so doing, the Court rejected the notion that the employees were so 
inaccessible that non-employee access was justified.  In contrast, the Court cited 
cases involving employees who lived in logging and mining camps as examples of 
situations in which access appropriately could be ordered because direct contact 
with employees outside of work was rarely possible.25  On the facts before the 
Court in Lechmere, it noted  that the union had contacted many employees in the 
metropolitan area, thus showing that there were alternative means of 
communication available.26  The court also pointed to the possible use of signs, 
advertising, picketing, and other means of giving notice to employees as ways in 
which communication options were “readily available.”27  In sum, said the Court, 
“Access to employees, not success in winning them over, is the critical issue.”28    
 
The Court’s dissenting justices challenged the majority’s interpretation of past 
precedent as constraining union organizing rights previously recognized by the 
                                                 
23Id., 502 U.S. at 535, citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of 
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978). 
24Id., 502 U.S. at 538. 
25Id., 502 U.S. at 539. 
26Id., 502 U.S. at 540. 
27Id. 
28Id. 
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Supreme Court, as a departure from the need to defer to the Board’s administrative 
expertise, and, on the merits, as improperly disregarding the semi-public nature of 
the Lechmere shopping center parking lot.29  At the core of the dissent is the view 
that applying Section 7 of the NLRA requires an assessment of whether actual 
communication is feasible absent union access, not whether a union merely can 
give notice of its intent to organize.30    
                                                 
29Id., 502 U.S. at 542-543.  
30Id., 502 U.S. at 543. 
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The Lechmere decision has been subject to critical commentary in the legal and 
labor relations fields, including observations beyond those made by the dissenting 
justices.31  First, Lechmere has been criticized as unnecessarily creating a protected 
zone of private employer property in which union organizers, with rare exception, 
cannot enter.  As an alternative approach, the Court in Lechmere (and in Babcock 
& Wilcox) could have treated organizing rights as they were dealt with in the 
earlier Republic Aviation case involving communications by employees at the 
workplace; that is, by applying a reasonableness test to take employer production 
and efficiency interests into account in assessing whether union access is 
appropriate.32  Employer property rights are not mentioned in the NLRA as a 
domain protected against union access, much less granted automatic protection 
without regard to any employer reason other than its ownership of property.  By 
shifting the legal focus from the trespass laws  to the issue of unacceptable union 
interference with workplace needs, the Board and courts could utilize a single 
standard that is  not tethered to lines of property, while freeing the Board to use a 
flexible approach taking into account the real workplace circumstances in any 
particular case.  Whether the Babcock & Wilcox decision mandated the result in 
Lechmere decades later can be debated by scholars, but, as a practical matter, there 
can be little doubt that unions suffered a major setback in Lechmere.   
 
A second criticism concerns the Court’s premise drawing a bright property line 
distinction for on-site employees and for off-site union organizers.  This premise is 
questionable under the NLRA.  Section 2(3) of the NLRA defines “employee” in 
broad terms, stating that the statute covers “any employee, and shall not be limited 
to the employees of a particular employer.”33   In the words of a leading labor law 
treatise, the Court’s failure in Lechmere, and, before that in Babcock & Wilcox,  to 
address the definition of an “employee” under Section 2(3) amounted to a 
“judicially created substantive distinction.”34  The distinction is particularly 
                                                 
31See, e.g., Gorman and Finkin, Labor Law (2d ed.), pp. 238-245; Ray, Sharpe and Strassfeld, 
Understanding Labor Law (2d ed.), pp. 69-77; Gorman, Union Access to Private Property: A Critical 
Assessment of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 Hofstra Lab. L. J. 1 (1991); Estlund, Labor, Property, and 
Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 305 (1994). 
32See, e.g., Estlund, supra, n. 26, citing Republic Aviation Corp v.NLRB, 351 U.S. 105.  Also 
see Peyton Packing Co., 49 NLRB 828, 843-844 (1943). 
3329 U.S.C. Section 152(3). 
34Gorman & Finkin, Labor Law, supra, at 239 
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worrisome for situations in which unions seek to organize employees on an 
industry-wide basis, thereby giving consideration to employee mobility as well as 
anticipating employer concerns about accepting unionization and operating at a 
higher cost-basis than competitors. 
   
Third, Lechmere reinforced an advantage favoring employers in terms of 
resistance to union organizing in the workplace.  As now construed, the NLRA 
permits employers to speak freely to employees about anti-union preferences, at 
least as long as a speech is not coercive or recklessly intimidating.35  These speech 
rights include leeway for an employer to assemble employees for what is known as 
a “captive audience” speech to present anti-union views.36  In the captive audience 
situation, unions are denied a right to reply on the employer’s property, even if the 
employer’s speech has been so threatening as to constitute a violation of the 
NLRA.   
 
As a consequence of the Lechmere decision, unions have accelerated efforts to find 
ways around the restrictions that have been imposed.  One approach involves 
increased reliance on distribution of union literature at the workplace since such 
material can be protected from employer retaliation under the “mutual aid” prong 
of Section 7.37  In an era of increasing use of , email, this method of making contact 
is leading to situations in which unions are testing the limits of permissible 
communications. Another approach involves the expansion of union and 
employee rights under state law.  In California, for example, the state’s 
constitutional “free speech” provision permits shopping center access for citizen 
(and union) advocates seeking large-scale public contact.38  California also has 
adopted regulations permitting access by agricultural unions that are not covered 
by the NLRA.39  A third approach increasingly used by unions is to send 
organizers to apply for jobs with employers who are being targeted by union 
organizing campaigns.  This practice, known as “salting,” has been upheld by the 
                                                 
35NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969) 
36NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (NuTone and Avondale), 357 U.S. 357 (1958); 
Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 NLRB 400 (1953). 
37Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556 (1978). 
38Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal.3d 899 (1979); Glendale Assoc., Ltd. v. 
NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2003). 
39ALRB v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.3d 392 (1976). 
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Supreme Court against employer attempts to imply an exclusion under the 
NLRA’s definition of “employee.”40 
 
It is unlikely that the rule of law adopted in Lechmere can be reversed by the 
Board under current Court doctrine, even though modern society has developed 
substantial and practical impediments to communications with workers.  These 
impediments include dispersed urban and suburban areas, employee commuting 
over vast distances, and ever-longer workdays for many.  Similar arguments were 
raised in Lechmere, and rejected.  The Court’s declaration of what is “clear” under 
the NLRA would, in all probability, require a statutory change in the U.S. Congress 
if unions wanted to open the door to wider non-employee access.   Absent such 
political change, unions must find alternatives, blunt or clever, to avoid the near-
absolute property protections established by Lechmere. 
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